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noted that Walker Lands and the State were the only parties involved
in the lawsuit at trial and no other persons or private entities were involved. Further, the court found no direct evidence in the record of
any direct violation by State officials or State departments attempting
to invade Walker Lands' property. Consequently, no justiciable controversy between Walker Lands and the State or the public-at-large existed. Thus, the trial court improperly issued a permanent injunction
against both the State's use of the property and the public's-at-large
use of the property; accordingly, the court reversed the permanent
injunction. In doing so, the court noted trespass actions are the
proper vehicle for the landowner to use in order to prevent the exploitation of his/her property for recreational purposes.
Finally, the state argued that the trial judge erred by unilaterally
converting its motion for a suspensive appeal into a devolutive appeal.
Specifically, the trial judge marked out the word suspensive and wrote
in devolutive on the draft order the State submitted. The court concluded that under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, the trial
judge retained discretion to convert the motion.
In conclusion, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that
Walker Lands owned Gassoway Lake and the surrounding lands; reversed the trial court's grant of a permanent injunction; and remanded
the matter to the trial court for the calculation of trial court costs, assessed equally against the parties.
Benjamin M. Petre
MAINE
S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. AP-03-70, 2004 Me.
Super. LEIS 115 (Me. Super. Ct. May 4, 2004) (holding that license
renewal for hydroelectric dams required certification subject to water
quality certification pursuant to the Clean Water Act).
S.D. Warren Company ("Warren") owned and operated the Dundee, Gambo, Little Falls, Mallison Falls, and Saccarappa hydroelectric
generating dam projects ("Projects") on the Presumpscot River. The
Projects provided electricity to Warren's paper mill. When the Projects' operating licenses lapsed, Warren filed for renewal. Along with
his application for continued operations, he also requested certification. In April 2003 the Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP") approved the applications and granted certification subject to
several conditions. Warren appealed the order to the Maine Board of
Environmental Protection ("BEP"). The BEP subsequently denied his
appeal.

On appeal to the Superior Court of Maine, Warren contended the
BEP erred by requiring the Projects to pass water quality certification
under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The CWA requires any application for a federal permit or license for an activity that may result in a

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

discharge is subject to certification. A discharge is any addition to the
water source, despite the nonexistence of pollutants. The court held
that because the Projects rerouted the natural flow of the river, this
constituted a discharge subject to certification under the CWA.
The relevant water quality certification required the Projects maintain seasonally varied minimum flows, install eel and fish passage, and
develop and implement a recreational facility enhancement plan.
Warren argued these requirements were void, stating the BEP could
not impose conditions to enhance the aquatic habitat. Further, Warren contended as long as some part of the water supported the designated uses, the Projects met the standards.
The BEP previously ruled increased flows in the bypass reach assure the waters could support all indigenous aquatic species. The
court upheld BEP's conclusion, reasoning there was ample evidence
that DEP had the authority to restore expired fish species and increase
the populations of existing species. Thus, the BEP's conclusions regarding minimum flows were not in error. Further, the BEP found
that installation of upstream and downstream passage for fish and eels
ensured the waterways remained suitable for fishing and habitat since
the dams at each Project affected both upstream eel migration and
downstream fish and eel passage. The court upheld this finding as
sufficiently supported by the record. The court also upheld the BEP's
finding with respect to recreational facilities. The relevant state statute
dictated that this water should remain suitable for recreation. The
Projects eliminated the opportunity for fishing and prevented access to
many areas of the river. Consequently, the court concluded Warren
was required to implement a recreational facility enhancement plan
pursuant to the BEP's ruling.
Warren also asserted the imposition of these conditions violated
Maine's antidegradation policy by reducing the Projects' average annual generation rates from 40.5 to 34.5 million kWh. The court held
this reduction was not enough to violate the antidegradation policy.
Next, Warren claimed the BEP's reliance on the Bureau of Land
and Water Quality's Hydropower Project Flow and Water Level Policy
("Water Level Policy"), absent proper rulemaking procedures, was inappropriate. The BEP found, and the court agreed, the DEP relied on
a mere presumption as to the flow needed to meet aquatic life and
habitat standards. Because this presumption was rebuttable, it did not
carry the force and effect of law, and was therefore an acceptable standard for guidance.
Warren also claimed the BEP erred in its interpretation of the instantaneous dissolved oxygen criterion. Warren argued the standard
should have been a calculation based on a daily average, not an instantaneous measurement. In determining the intent of the legislature,
the court first looked to the plain meaning of the statute and then to
the legislative history. The court determined that reading the statute
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as requiring an average was unreasonable. If oxygen levels dropped
below minimum for any length of time, there would not be enough
oxygen in the water to sustain fish. Therefore, the BEP correctly interpreted the criterion as a matter of law.
Finally, Warren argued the BEP's re-opener provisions were void.
This argument failed because the court concluded the provisions were
necessary to ensure the state's water quality standards. Further, the
provisions allowed Warren notice and a hearing, as well as an opportunity to appeal. Thus, the court held the BEP correctly included the reopener provisions.
In summary, the Superior Court of Maine affirmed the decisions of
the BEP because the evidence in the record was consistent with their
judgment.
JenniferSu/i
MICHIGAN
City of Brighton v. Township of Hamburg, 677 N.W.2d 349 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2004) (affirming that the Michigan National Resources and Environmental Protection Act preempted a township ordinance regulating
permissible wastewater discharge levels into state waterways).
The city of Brighton ("Brighton") applied to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") to expand its discharge
permit for its wastewater treatment plant. The township of Hamburg
("Hamburg") filed an objection to Brighton's request with DEQ. The
referee in the administrative hearing held in favor of Brighton. DEQ
then issued Brighton a revised National Pollution Discharge Elimination Permit ("NPDEP"). However, to prevent the expansion of Brighton's wastewater treatment plant, Hamburg subsequently passed an
ordinance that imposed more stringent restrictions on wastewater discharges than the restrictions imposed by NPDEP. Brighton filed suit in
the Livingston Circuit Court, contending Michigan's National Resources and Environmental Protection Act ("NREPA") preempted
Hamburg's ordinance. The trial court granted Brighton's motion for
summary disposition on the grounds that NREPA preempted Hamburg's ordinance. Hamburg appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals. On appeal, the court affirmed the preemption ruling.
To review the trial court's preemption ruling, the court applied the
principles articulated in People v. Llewellyn. Llewellyn established a twopart test for determining whether state law precludes a municipality
from enacting an ordinance. Pursuant to Llewellyn, state law preempts
a local ordinance if: (1) the ordinance is in direct conflict with the
state statutory scheme; or (2) the state statutory scheme occupies the
field of regulation that the municipality seeks to enter, even where
there is no direct conflict between the two regulatory schemes. The
court found the second part of the Llewellyn test applicable, and there-

